In the Catacombs of Kiev
Kiev's strategy was to get NATO weapons in exchange for sacrificing men, performing a bid for regaining control of the territories lost, following the Russian invasion. It has backfired. What now?
Commissary rule
As Kiev is running out of manpower and is unable to counter Moscow’s bid for air dominance, pressure mounts on the leadership. The government structures in Kiev are basic: unity of command is difficult to obtain; commissaries loom large under Martial Law, where most orders are by decree. We name this form of governance, where those who can command and get things done gather to rule together: junta. When a society is on the brink of collapse, governance by junta can be the only way to protect citizens in the polity. The Ukraine was born in a very difficult situation and never came to build a viable state, prone as it were to plutocracy and the fallacies of an anarcho-liberal political condition after the Soviet Union disappeared. In 2014 Ukraine fell into intra-state conflict and following the Russian invasion in 2022, Kiev proclaimed Martial Law. The current junta is a collective of commanders around the informal political leadership of military intelligence officer Budanov and head of security Malyuk with commander in chief Zuluzhnyi having the final say in coordinating army matters.
A sidelined presidency
When it comes to governance in Ukraine there is no sign that the president Zelensky has any clue about anything but taking orders and bribes from Washington and is currently portrayed by most observers as living in a delusional world concerning realities on the ground in the Russo-Ukrainian war, the prime issue in Ukrainian politics. Zelensky, formally seated at the table end in the cabinet, is a very good fund raiser and propagandist, no doubt; he may even believe himself, some of the rhetoric he produces and from the moment he took office in 2019 he has been able to demand legitimacy from all who are ignorant to Ukrainian politics and the workings of plutocracy by keeping up appearances that he has something to say in matters of government and governance. It is very unclear what Zelensky understands of actual governance and international relations, and unlikely that whatever he decides makes much sense to those who shall implement policies. Zelensky is a US puppet and have until recently been quite efficient in that role, with an impressive public relations record, especially when one considers that it was clear to most politically aware Ukrainian citizens already in 2021, that he had turned his back on his election platform of ‘peace with Russia and lowering corruption,’ by instead openly hugging and taking selfies with Biden and the Ukrainian mafia. Let’s just say that his PR show works better with parliamentarians in the West than with the man on the street in Kharkov or Odessa. For those who wishes to remove the current regime could seek to use Zelensky as a battering ram against Zuluzhnyi with the aim of deposing the commissaries. Tensions in the cabinet are now visible in public positioning of actors.
Looking out from the bunker
Anyway, besides the fracturing government: What are the political aims of the junta in Kiev? How do they see the situation? In the spring we heard the rhetoric of the coming victory with the wonder weapons of the West, but saw that it was all an illusion and did the math. As summer begun it was time to calculate: Kiev lost 0,5% of its strength a day; after around 140 days of fighting (from 4th of June to 3rd of November minus 13 rest days is 140 days) that is 0,5% x 140 days = strength reduced in the period by 70%. The estimate holds and now Kiev is on the backfoot along the whole frontline (currently with the exception of Kherson) due to lack of soldiers, ammunition and the devastating results of a penetrated air defence, leaving the Russians a free hand in bombing trenches and fortresses at the front with steady losses on both sides. With no strategic objectives met that amount to total defeat for Kiev’s so-called counteroffensive, who has nothing to show for the loss of life. In general: A symmetric war of attrition is catastrophic for Kiev; Moscows power is simply overwhelming in terms of manpower and production. Of course, the junta in Kiev is not stupid. Some of them may have understood the fatality of commencing an offensive without any advantages on the battlefield, already at the outset of the so-called counteroffensive or have come to realize it soon thereafter: there was no way that the blue and yellow forces would get to Tokmak. It just didn’t compute. But while the generals that the junta relied on, stole what they could of money and materiel from the defence ministry to satisfy the hungry dysfunctional plutocracy, the junta was itself stuck with the narrative they had bought onto, a narrative that was forged in the deal with Washington. As the narrative of the coming victory echoed in the western media, it created the perfect illusion for Western parliaments to keep up the flow of money and weapons. Now it is all spend, leaving the junta in a bit of a squeeze: What should be the strategy going forward?
Defence is the only viable option
When we look at Zaluzhnyi’s latest sales pitch published in The Economist, he claims that Kiev will be able to progress towards victory if only they manage to build a fourth army. He needs 1) ammunitions, 2) fighter jets, 3) drones, 4) electronic warfare and other high-tech equipment, including advanced counter batteries. Basically, he needs everything. Kiev will provide manpower, he claims, but here it is quite uncertain how Kiev is going to deliver soldiers that can make a difference fighting Moscow’s relatively experienced forces, who are slowly but surely advancing again after having destroyed the first three armies Kiev mustered. This time with the use of manned aircraft as well as swarms of drones. Of course, one can remain delusional and believe one’s own propaganda, but then one day the view from the bunker will be directly into the canon barrel of a tank. It is time to remove the colored glasses from the eyes and take a deep look at the situation: If Kiev does not perform a defensive posture and shows willingness to negotiate on Moscows terms soon, then the idea of a functional Ukrainian state will never be realized.
The view from above
Let us get an objective perspective: What is the endgame that Kiev can hope for. First, what are the priorities? We see two options: 1) There shall be a state by the name of Ukraine. This entails a viable state hence as a minimum the possibility to operate a port in Odessa for shipping out primarily grain and sunflower oil; 2) The population currently loyal to Kiev and the aspirations of the Lviv elites become a protectorate of Poland to be awaiting annexation by the EU thus commencing a process of ‘returning to Poland.’ Whether the Poles are interested in such arrangement is another matter and could be a serious obstacle. Which option is the best and which is more realistic can be debated, but since it will take some time before anyone sees the necessity to contemplate anything but option 1), we shall deal with forming a strategic objective around the goal of forging an independent entity, Ukraine, as the solution to The Ukraine Question.
Outcome of a prolonged conflict
If Kiev does not begin to concede defeat soon, then the conflict will continue to narrow the possible outcomes. The current situation on the ground points to a division along the Dnipro river with a de facto ceasefire as the base for a tentative agreement. This will satisfy Moscow’s objective of pushing NATO away from the Russian southern border and hold Kiev out of the alliance. It will leave the city of Kiev within immediate bombardment range by all sorts of artillery hence a tradeoff could be sought by having the current Kiev oblast with a tiny bufferzone on the left bank of the river under Kiev control in exchange for guarantees of demilitarization. The aim will thus be to forge an economy around agriculture and tech industry with a GDP of 5000$ per capita annually by sustaining a state with police, administration, and taxation with Kiev or perhaps better Lviv as the capital. Politically, Kiev must concede neutrality hence swear off NATO membership. At the moment this is utterly unsatisfactory for the junta and their backers, but the longer Washington waits, the closer we come to a situation where option 2) is preferable and perhaps the only viable option. The coming years will show the window closing for the Ukraine; it could also end up as a decaying political entity often referred to by John Mearsheimer as ‘a dysfunctional rump state’; but that is only a seemingly viable option.
In conclusion
15 years ago, the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, claiming that it was the right of all countries to choose their geopolitical affiliation, seemed like a good idea and the obvious course to many without insight into geopolitics and to none with such insight, due to the scenario we are currently in. Considering how slowly reality sinks into the heads of western governments, due to the thick layer of think tanks and ideology that surrounds them, all lobbying for more conflict with pretty principles and lofty promises, it becomes more and more likely that we will see the second option sought implemented as months turn into years. Geopolitically speaking, the prospect is clear. Surely those who receive the actual reports from the frontline are beginning to add it all up. An interesting question is therefore: what happens in the junta in Kiev when they realize that a defensive posture focusing on cutting loses and establishing a fort around Odessa is the only way to survive as a nation-state? What will then be the sales pitch to Washington? How will it seek to legitimize its leadership? What is the alternative?