Ukraine revisited III
In Ukraine things are not going well for the alliance. It hurts on all fronts. Not least the strategic and material capabilities of the enemy causes severe headaches all the way to Washington.
While there is talk in the West of new aid packages and appropriating Russian assets, distributing money to weapons manufacturers and the regime in Kiev, the question remains what kind of weaponry could aid the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in stalling the steadily advancing Russian forces. NATO and friends seems to have already tried everything without success. For instance, UAF have attempted to deploy the much hyped Abrams tanks, despite their inadequacy vis a vis the theater; Abrams is a heavy, high maintenance, fuel gulping tank, difficult to steer for untrained personnel, and after a handfull was lost in the spring mud, deployment to the battlefield of this announced wonder-weapon is again halted. What is needed is men with high moral behind well designed fortifications. Without that, the rest is staffage.
Russian arms prevail
There is high sensitivity in Washington when it comes to the actual use of weapons fabricated in The West; it has proven much easier to laugh about the problems of the opposition when they get stuck in the murky soil of Ukraine, than getting the fancy equipment received from USA, U.K., France and allies to make a viable appearance at the front: The price of a weapon is higher before it is tested in battle, unless it is deployed with success. Now the laugh is on them. Building up to Victory Day on 9th of may 2024, the Russians had piled up ceased NATO weaponry, and put it on display at a fare outside of Moscow. The clashing of armies in Ukraine has underlined that in the shifting climatic conditions in Ukraine simple and reliable weapons are more efficient than high tech showroom pieces, and this has increased demand for Russian weapons on the global market. Despite light artillery and the renowned S- air defense series, also electronic warfare equipment, and even the sparsely tested fifth generation aircraft Su-57 has caught the eye of governments around the globe.
Ingenuity vs. showroom dummies
The Russians have adapted to the challenges by applying a few modifications. Their modus vivendi is bombing fortifications by means of glide-bombs, huge explosive devises added wings that allows them to be fired from the air outside the range of UAF air defences. After pounding the UAF positions, The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFR) move in with ‘turtle tanks,’ armored vehicles covered with a drone-shield making them look like ancient battering rams, from where infantry can be introduced to take up positions. When they are settled at the outskirts of a settlement AFR begin volleying endless artillery showers in front of their stormtroopers until they can raise the flag on a building, if there is one left, when they are finally done. It may be primitive, but it is terrifyingly effective. Kiev have received some modern missiles but until now they have decided to use most of them in attempts of scoring propaganda victories instead of concentration their firepower on the military targets. Take the ATACMs that are used over Crimea; they got shot down by S-400s, but what were they aiming at? It is highly unclear what UAFs strategy is, if they ever really had any, beyond getting more money flowing from the West.
The battle for Donbas
Now as the Earth dries up, analysts are beginning to expect AFR to commence an offensive from Belgorod down into the Ukraine east of Kharkiv and west of the Oskil river, with the aim of cutting off UAF forces in Luhansk from their supplies. At the moment UAF are bugged down in sustaining the enormous frontline and slowing down the AFR breakthrough towards Pokrovsk, the strategic hub in eastern Ukraine between Kharkiv and the southern stronghold named Volydar. Until now, AFR has focused on pushing the UAF away from shelling distance to Donnetsk by expanding the salient west of Avdiivka in direction of Chassiv Yar, the last natural place for a defensive position before the Dnipro: Chassiv Yar, a name you will probably hear quite a deal in the next month, is situated on high grounds east of Bakhmut. Despite giving the citizens of Donnetsk relief after 10 years of alert, capturing Chassiv Yar will allow for further attacks in multiple directions and give AFR the ability to amass troops on a hitherto unprecedented scale in Donbas, thus give Moscow the possibility to prepare for a push towards Zaporizjzja, from where Odessa can be threatened. UFA defeat is immanent; the question is now whether or not there shall be a state named ‘Ukraine,’ in the future.
The end
What two years ago appeared to be a war that would last 7 years or more is now likely to be over soon. The scenario sketched out above could be reality within a year or two. Of course, Kiev is overwhelmed and should have capitulated long ago. Now the issue is to get Moscow to accept capitulation: Why should Kremlin trust Washington and halt their advances? Lately, there have been rumors spreading that NATO was considering getting directly involved. Moscow would not allow for such strategic ambiguity to persist hence on monday 6/5 the French and British ambassadors were summoned to the Kremlin and told, that any strike on Russian soil by use of their weapons would be met with retaliation in kind from Russian Federation against their troops in Ukraine or where ever Moscow saw fit. This threat has led to more or less clear announcements from Paris and the headquarter in Bruxelles, that NATO will stay out of the fight: No boots on the ground. London, clearly having prepared for an attack to irritate The Kremlin as it announced its new government and celebrated victory, is licking its wounds in silence. As the propaganda tools become increasingly obsolete, the realities on the ground gain prominence: UAF is out of able men and morale; leadership it never had. Our thoughts go out to the people in the Ukraine, as the last act of this tragedy unfolds.
Kievs forces are worn thin → makes sense to open a new front with fokus on pushing through to the East of Kharkiv, threatening to cut off UAF forces to the east of the Oskol river. An offensive would have the strategic objective of passing through to Sloviansk and thereby capture the remaining parts of Lugiansk and Donnetsk oblasts. Thereby Moscow would not only free Donnetsk city from artillery, but also securing it as a major hub for accumulating forces to prepare further projecting of power in direction of the southern part of the Dnipro river