50 - 50 chance

A negotiated settlement in the Ukraine war is unlikely; after all the war came, because the parties could not come to terms with each others interest.

In the beginning, I though that the Ukraine war was going to last 7+ years. That was based on the capabilities of the respective powers and their strategic outlook, sustaining the 1990ies assessment that the inability of NATO to project power through the territory of Ukraine was limited, and that would determine the outcome in a war of attrition. Given the strategic blunders by Kyiv to constantly seek the attention of the NATO countries through gaining ‘propaganda victories,’ rather than optimal use of their army and reserves, I now expect it to last no longer than 2026, that is 4 years instead of 8.

In 2025 i see 3 possible outcomes:

1)        Capitulation; by Ukraine or by Russia after a decisive victory by either party.

2)        Negotiated settlement; Moscow and Kyiv seeking a settlement.

3)        The fight goes on, with NATO backing Kyiv and Moscow grinding on till the end.

Explanation and evaluation

Add 1) The first option is quite likely, although no one has provided a comprehensible idea to what would constitute Ukrainian victory or how it should come about. I give it 40% chance. If Kyiv capitulate now, though, by conceding to Moscow’s demand (baseline): No NATO in Ukraine, Kyiv withdrawal from Moscow annexed territories, disbanding certain groups, and demilitarization. Since this proposal was not taken the last time around, there may be additional demands (annexation of Odessa and Kharkiv oblasts would optimize Moscows sense of security). This option will be more and more likely, as the conflict drags on along the lines, we have seen until now, where Kyivs situation becomes more and more untenable. If the demilitarization of Ukraine is completed on the battlefield, it is Moscow’s intention to discuss the topic of Ukraine with NATO, in the context of a European security architecture, something the governments of NATO countries has until now, sought to avoid.

Add 2) The second option, I give 0% chance. Right now, Russia has nothing to win from negotiating. After the incursion by The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) into Kursk, an oblast in the Russian Federation, Moscow will not be able to confront Kiev in dialogue before they have expelled AFU from Kursk. Proponents of the idea of initiating negotiation often overlooks, that The Armed Forces of Russia (AFR) has a decisive advantage on the battlefield, and therefore ‘negotiations’ will in fact be talks on the base of capitulation (1).

Add 3) The third option is very likely, still. I give it 60% chance. Washington may be shifting attitude towards the conflict, but cannot force Russia to negotiate a settlement beyond its baseline, without at least having the European security architecture on the table, and it is (thus) unlikely that the Europeans will stop providing incentives for Kyiv to fight on. This gambles the further loss of oblasts.

In conclusion

The most likely is that we end up in a situation, where Ukraine, as we now it, will cease to exist, following option 3, for instance if Odessa is lost. But if Kyiv keeps on going for propaganda stunts like now, occupying some territory in the Kursk region, without anyone grasping what the purpose of that could be, rapidly depleting its resources, option 1 becomes increasingly likely. Let’s say, that by the time you are reading this, it is 50% – 50%.