Giant confusion
What does NATO want? Ukraine is invited to join, but the door will remain closed and locked for decades while conflict over this invitation will drain both Russia, Ukraine and NATO. Why?
Four significant developments in the stance towards NATO’s adversary Russia, came out of NATO summit in Vilnius 2023: 1) No post-Bucharest 2008 commitment to Ukraine for NATO membership; 2) Nordic countries security guarantee post-conflict; 3) Cruise missiles from France and U.K. to Kiev. 4) Formal accession of Sweden and Finland into the alliance creating near dominance of Baltic Sea, leaving Black Sea as an intensively contested area. It all amounts to escalation around the current conflict on the territory designated to Ukraine by the UN charter. Why remains an open question, but we can narrow it down by analysis:
1) NATO opened the door to membership for Ukraine in 2008 but has not been able to substantiate the invitation, since. The Russian leader stated then that for Kremlin Ukraine membership in NATO constituted the clearest of red lines to be crossed. NATOs general secretary expressed in Vilnius that Russia ‘shall not decide’ whether Ukraine comes into NATO. This is a blatant display of geopolitical ignorance since it indicates unwillingness to recognize the need for Russia to have a say in the matter. Russia has brought the matter from Minsk I to Minsk II to UNSC to no avail. The subject is clearly contested hence this statement is strange and confrontational in a precarious situation. As if both the stakes and the situation are unknown to NATO. This display of NATO leadership vacuum gives a posture of ‘unable to move’ leaving no room for negotiation without Russian willingness to withdraw from the battlefield without any incentive to do so and heavily invested in the war: Killed in Action in Ukraine was 2014 – 2021 = 14.000 (according to UN), and lately 2022 – 2023 = 100.000 (my estimate). The number of wounded soldiers is extremely worrying and poses the question about Kiev’s ability to build yet another army to hold their ground. NATOs posture is officially that war in Ukraine is indefinite, since NATO is unable to progress on the battlefield without risking direct confrontation with Russia, why Germany and USA reasserted stance of ‘strategic ambiguity.’ Kremlin has proclaimed that it will open the northern front again on 5th of August, 2023. Kiev is in despair and denial concerning facts on the ground.
2) Guarantee from Nordic countries to Ukraine when the war ends, which could take more than 5 years, but could also come soon, following a collapse of Kiev, either militarily, or politically. These guarantees are sought to be effective in a post war diplomatic environment where Ukraine is on a path to membership in NATO. From a geopolitical consideration, should such situation occur, that Russia would accept peace without reaching its objective of Ukrainian neutrality, these guarantees are extremely hazardous. No Nordic countries have nuclear weapons and rely passively on NATO article 5 guarantees, concerning nuclear deterrence. Even with a normal sense of prudence ignored, should security guarantees be issued, then they should only be given to Ukraine under the auspices of neutrality to stay safe from the intensification of dilemmas that seems to prevail in all scenarios of destabilization of Ukraine in a post-war situation. This should be corrected immediately, so as to signal sanity and willingness to negotiate with point of departure in realities, not least for the sake of saving face for NATO. Security guarantees in case of implementing Ukrainian neutrality makes sense, where Nordic countries could corporate with non-NATO guarantors, but the imprudent waving of NATO members issuing guarantees in a post-conflict scenario will be viewed as a provocation by Kremlin.
3) Handing missiles to Kiev that can reach Moscow is extremely dangerous. The decision to deliver cruise missiles at this point, can only have been taken because modern ministry of foreign affairs are vacuumed from people with insight into the political: If we ask members of the administration, diplomats and academics what is ‘plutocracy?’ - or ‘how does a junta actually work?’, answers are deplorably ignorant and the fragility of Ukraine, that is a prime driver of the conflict between USA, EU, and Russia concerning Kiev and its government since its inception, escalating from the turn of the millennium till today, is only scarcely understood by political elites in the West. Should the current junta fragment, then the presence of cruise missiles in the hands of an uncontrollable actor, could have devastating consequences under the current casus belli auspices. Essentially, the choice of weapon signals desperation; it will be very difficult to deploy F 16 to bases inside Ukraine, hence the current Russian dominance of fixed wing, but especially Ka – 52 helicopters, will be difficult to break: instead of seeking to reach the Russian line of defense, disruption of a Russian offensive by missiles makes sense, but strategically, handing cruise missiles to Kiev is admitting, that the territory is lost, which is in stark contrast to the rhetoric of ‘fighting till the end to restore 2014 borders.’ Any serious observer will doubt whether NATO can comprise just one of three crucial elements: coherent vision, strategic objective, and competent leadership. NATO should be Western and adopt the enlightenment credo: ‘critique is what makes us stronger,’ to regain its identity. But that will take time after this. Call for unity in common cause cannot cover for the disparate interests. Prudence and the will to address the most salient issue at hand, would have been infinitely better for NATO.
4) Behind the scenes and beyond The Ukraine Question, we see The Taiwan Question looming large. Unity at all costs is understandable when a political organization is under pressure. Finland and Sweden joining the alliance improves conventional battle strength and economic muscle substantially; the balance vis a vis Russia is close to 100 – 1. The idea that Russia was ever a threat to NATO after the fall of The Soviet Union is a chimera, a very important chimera since it has driven the security dilemma towards the current confrontation by proxy that is The Ukraine War, but an attack by Russia on a NATO country would be short and attacking 1 to 100 would be a unique event in the History of Civilization. Well, chimeras are not woven by real threads; threats are often quite imaginary: Does Kremlin really fear NATO? Despite NATO being enormous, seems to be ruthless and beyond the rules it sets for the world, it does come closer and closer to Moscow, armed to its teeth by offensive weapons, and unwilling to recognize other strategic interests but its own. When its doctrine becomes blurred, questions like: Why does NATO want Ukraine so badly as to build three armies on the territory (2014 – 2023)? And when the answer to such questions is not easily given, beyond ideological statements how Ukraine ought to be able to choose, heralding of idealistic principles and lofty references to ‘a rule based order,’ that never materialized because NATO could not subject to any rules, we hear no attempts to answer this question, and thus the security dilemma begins to run amok. What is unclear is what the interests of NATO in the Black Sea really are, beyond dealing with the constructed chimera. How shall Moscow interpret NATOs posture? Now the Baltic Sea is all but dominated by NATO: Can anyone understand why Russia would interpret dominance in The Black Sea and Ukraine in NATO as a step towards containment? If not, perhaps geopolitics is lost on you: What do you think would happen if China were to place missiles on Cuba or in Mexico? – What happened when The Soviet Union place missiles on Cuba in 1962?
A confused giant
What is the vision of security in NATO? – And what are the strategic objectives that can reach the goals of that vision? Is security a zero-sum game in which all other interests shall be succumbed by military force? Should NATO become political and not only ideological? Could NATO declare its interest and make steps towards realizing its objectives instead of mere confusion and propaganda? Is the war in Ukraine the right way to secure the interest of member countries or is it only the interest of the ruling oligarchy in one? The following years, the demand for answers will create divisions in NATO, if leadership is not obtained, and chances are slim that NATO will realize its disarray before it is too late. Again: without vision, strategy, or leadership, NATO will remain confused and continue to act irrationally. How come, when the current situation, where NATO seems to believe that it has no better choice than a prolonged conflict in Ukraine, was foreseen and cautioned by all scholars in the fields of International Politics more than 20 years ago (Huntington 1998, Mearsheimer 2001, Schweller 2002, Buzan and Wæver 2003), because it is simply the basic dynamic in international relations unfolding. How come that NATO has ended up here? – Is it braindead, as some have suggested? Was it because Russia suddenly turned evil and wanted to restore The Soviet Union? Does anyone believe that?
An open wound
All that came out of the summit regarding the conflict with Russia was escalation in rhetoric and posture. But with what aim in sight? To deter Russia and seek de-escalation? Who believes that to be possible? The Russian Federation has no reason to move an inch on the battlefield after this and is still able to move forward. Was the aim to display unity in NATO? Well in that case the balloon is blown into full size, now. What comes next is reality and the questions to be answered: Why was it such a bad idea to have a conflict with Russia in Ukraine? Of course, the people living on the territory must suffer or move; had they been considered, NATO may not have followed Washington blindly into the abyss, but they are not really part of the equation. War was s a bad idea because once this wound is open, it will be very difficult closing it again, since neither Washington nor Moscow will easily concede. And which of the NATO countries wants an endless conflict in Europe? Washington perhaps, weapons are big business and important for the rule, there, but who else. And when will the difference of interest begin to surface? When the conflict goes south?
The price of ignorance
If any sense was present at the Vilnius summit, then it was concealed well. The situation demanded for unity behind what to offer Russia in a negotiation between Kiev and Moscow, militarily and politically. Options were few; NATO has gone too far: Territory and neutrality must be conceded now. That is because the strategy was ill conceived, if it was conceived at all: When the new administration took office, Washington immediately chose for a strategy that contained the possibility for war, before the embrace between Biden and Zelenskyj on April 6th, 2021, following the 24 march presidential decree from Kiev to recapture Crimea. The two leaders send clear signals about their joint posture towards Russia without any of them carrying a public mandate to risk a war with Russia; seemingly they banked on deterrence of Russia from acting on their red line from Bucharest 2008, by the presence of the NATO trained army in Ukraine and US and EU threats of potential sanctions. This hazardous move was immediately spotted by young men in Ukraine, who started fleeing from what was considered a suicidal corrupt government seeking escalation with Russia. If Ukraine shall ever enter NATO, the it shall be ‘democratic’, whatever that means; that is NATOs final criteria. Here we may ask: Was the gamble to risk war with Russia really taken in the name of ‘democracy’? – Well in that case, it was taken in name only: Zelenskyj was elected on a platform of anti-corruption and negotiating peace with Russia, but soon lost all orientation; sunk deep into the plutocratic morads he ended up as a poster child between the Junta in Kiev and the oligarchy in Washington, leaving Ukraine without accountable international representation. It was all a bad bet by NATO. The Russians proved willing to fight. Now NATOs best option were to take responsibility, pay off the debt and let go: NATO had to acknowledge its mistake, take the fields they have earned, leave the rest to Russia, and guarantee neutrality of whatever Ukraine would be left after a peace deal. That was the realization needed to move forward: A meeting like the one in Vilnius could have been used for sobering and attain unity around a posture that could have sought to improve a posture by getting ready for negotiations with The Russian Federation. That was too difficult to muster, maybe because in 2008, NATO could have gotten that deal including Crimea and Donbas; it is difficult to fold your cards when so much has been invested, the poker player may tell you, but betting on having the Russians fold, when they have invested their own sons and have the better hand, is ludicrous. Now NATO have chosen to ignore its options and go all in with the chips they have thus risking Ukraine’s existence as a viable political entity and the chance for peace is all but gone.