NATOs dilemma

Today 11/7 2023 the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania takes place. On the surface, NATO can celebrate strength, unity and even two new members of the alliance. But appearances are not everything.

Summoned and united

There will be a lot of staffage and posturing, but the central theme of discussion at the Vilnius NATO summit 2023 is the strategy on Ukraine: in our perspective, how to deal with The Ukraine Question. NATO has pivoted around Kiev for decades. The regional power, Russia, has reacted, and in 2014 it annexed Crimea. This led to NATO building an army in Ukraine, a torn in the side for Russia. Since March 2022, Russia has occupied large parts of Southeastern Ukraine. This has invoked intense political unity in the NATO-alliance through metus hostilis: ‘common enemy unites.’ The rhetoric is clear: Russia poses a threat hence NATO must increase its posture towards the East, and the public sphere in member countries have political discourse aligned with the aim of enemy construction; any reflexivity by geopoliticians in Western countries is treated as equal to siting with evil. So far so good, but now NATO is facing a real dilemma concerning the choice of the way ahead.

The real issues

Colin Kahl, the US Undersecretary of Defense informed the press at a Pentagon briefing that the US would provide cluster bombs to ‘keep them in the fight in the context of the current counteroffensive and because things are going a little slower than some had hoped, there are very high expenditure on artillery rates. This is to make sure that the Ukrainians have the comfort that they have what they need, but also that the Russians know that the Ukrainians are gonna stay in the game.’ This is a quite telling quote. Firstly, Kiev and its US backers are seeking to convey the image to Russia and the world that they can fight. That says a lot about the so-called counter-offensive: The Ukrainian Armed Forces attack, not because that is what follows logically from a position of strength, but because they need to project an image, hiding the true state of affairs, possibly for the sake of scoring political gains at the Vilnius summit.

Ammo shortage

Secondly, the cluster bombs are to replace ordinary 155mm rounds, as we were later informed, because those are the 155mm rounds that NATO has in storage, since NATO is running out of ammunition for artillery, including 122mm rounds. Thirdly, since the reality on the ground is that Kiev has not gained a single hill or anything during the past 6 weeks of offensive operations, hence we could say that the counter-offensive is going slower than expected, but given the window of opportunity, it is much more precise to say that the chance for Kiev of reaching anything significant on the battlefield before the rain starts again in September is now zero: The strategic balance is tipping in a way, that all deployments available short of actual NATO boots on the ground should be released now, to achieve a balance power. Is NATO ready for that? – And will an all weapons in approach suffice? - Does NATO have additional significant contributions to make? Can Kiev handle these weapons tactically? - And what about the strategic level: Will Kiev be able to exercise the necessary restraint in dealing with cruise missils? - Can NATO avoid direct involvement by member states? - Would such direct involvement lead to Russian attacks on armed forces and bases of member states? - And then what: How would NATO react?

Narrative and reality

The Anglo-Saxon propaganda machine has always been efficient. In chapter 6 of Mein Kampf, Hitler admires the British and concludes that Germany had to at least match U.K. efforts, should Germany succeed in the next war. Fortunately, he came to believe in his own propaganda and the Germans got stuck, attacking where it did not have the capability to win hence collapsing in the try. Is NATO subject to the same mistake on getting high on its own supply? Does the NATO leadership believe in its own tale? For decades the idea that Russia would soon attack in Eastern Europe or Balticum, although it was significantly weaker than NATO, led NATO to seek security for Baltic states, Visegrád, Bulgaria, and Rumania, by enrolling these countries into NATO under the umbrella of article 5. What was not contemplated properly, was that this move to secure some could be perceived as a threat by others, i.e., Russia, especially after what happened to Serbia in 1999 only a few weeks after the NATO expansion: It is a classic security dilemma unfolding; the sense of security for one leads to the sense of insecurity for the other.

Is a pivot possible?

Has the aim of enhanced security led to its opposite? Was training and arming the Ukraine Armed forces from 2014 taking things a step too far? Possibly, but will it be within the scope of NATOs narrative to admit failure? Now, NATO must choose defeat on the battlefield or double down again: take a final step forward and engage NATO troops and airfields. Such step would bring its greatest fear into reality: direct confrontation with a regional power, Russia, armed to its teeth with nuclear weapons and a history of being a tough nut to crack for Westerners at war. Will NATO be able to shift from its principled approach of support for Kiev to the bitter end towards a more pragmatic approach, based on an analysis of the realities on the ground?