The Putin Doctrine
Russias military doctrine from 2000 - 2022 we name The Putin Doctrine after the leader in Kremlin. Apparently, following recent events, doctrine stands to be altered.
Two questions guide this essay
What is the strategic assessment that makes Kremlin deploy its forces?
What was the effect of the doctrine?
A new military doctrine
At the turn of the millennium regime change in Moscow facilitated a new military doctrine. As GDP growth returned and the Caucasus issues eased, Russia began to assert itself with more confidence globally, and particularly in its own region, where Russia is the dominant power in the shadow of the EU.
Shift of focus
In the 1990ies, Moscows focus had been on putting out fires at home and in the near abroad, where the prospect of intra-state conflicts were the order of the day. With Vladimir Putin a new approach came to national economy, policing, and ruling, bringing Russia from an anarcho-liberal condition to autocracy by taxing the oligarchy that emerged from the plutocracy of the 1990ies, restoring rule by law, and institutionalizing a dictatorship under Putin and his political entourage. Russia’s military doctrine became focused on a specific strategic objective: distancing NATO from its borders and its near abroad. To grasp a military doctrine, we look at deployment of troops and perception of threat. In describing the doctrine, we focus on its aim, what is often referred to as the ‘strategic objective,’ here seen from Kremlins perspective. Russia lost faith in western promises that there was no NATO enlargement and embarked on its own way to reassert itself as a great power. When Russia fell short of reaching status as a great power, it came under pressure by the superpower and its military alliance.
The Kremlin perception of NATO
Kremlin understands the military alliance NATO to be directed towards countering Russian interests hence NATO is to be balanced. After the bombing of Yugoslavia, it was clear to foreign policy elites in Russia, from liberals to conservatives, that nothing would stop NATO from expanding through destabilization and subjection. Elite consensus on this topic in and around Kremlin, guided the consolidation of the Russian regime’s foreign policy and contributed to political stability in Moscow. Where Kazakhstan and Belarus were closely linked to Russia by relationships approaching outright suzerainty, the most likely candidates of being targeted by NATO were Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. From 2003 it became clear that Ukraine and Georgia would be focus of attention while Turkish and US influences pulled Azerbaijan away from Russia and into NATO’s orbit. A specific issue here is the demarcation of the Russian sphere of influence, i.e., NATO acknowledgement of Russia’s security interest in South Eastern Europe, what we call The Ukraine Question. This became the central concern in The Putin Doctrine.
Russia’s geopolitical challenges
Moscow faced the challenge of A) colored revolutions, perceived by Kremlin as CIA facilitated attempts at destabilizing and paralyzing capitals in Eastern Europe, The Middle East, and Central Asia, and B) countries embarking on a path to membership of NATO. Kremlin used the destabilization and regionalization in the potential breakaway countries, caused by populations dreaming of being part of The West and grievances due to lack of state capacities, to support the permanence of so called ‘frozen conflicts’ on the territories. These challenges meant deployment of armed forces lending support to 1) Armenia’s claim to establish the Republic of Artsakh in Nagorno Karabakh on Azerbaijan’s territory, 2) Abkhazia’s bid for separation from Georgia, 3) the newly annexed Black Sea peninsula, Crimea, 4) sustaining a peace keeping force in Transnistria, in the eastern part of Moldova, and 5) balancing against Uzbekistan by using its leverage on Tajikistan to project power into the Fergana valley. The aim was to keep polities fragmented in crucial parts of its near abroad, so that: I) dependency of Russia remained high amongst its allies, and II) subjection under article 5 of the NATO alliance was unlikely for those who were not: The Musketeers oath of all for one and one for all, securing that NATO will respond as a collective to any attack on one of its members, would be too dangerous to invoke in polities, Kremlin gathered, where polity is fragmented by the presence of de facto states on their designated territory, hence NATO membership remained illusory as long as these polities remained fragmented. This calculus approved to be right, and the implementation of this grip, is what we call The Putin Doctrine.
Deployment of armed forces
Russia has guided the development of its armed forces to upholding contingents stationed in its near abroad as peace keeping forces while keeping its main force ready for disarming neighbors that were escaping Kremlin’s orbit. Beyond maintaining its nuclear arsenal, the Russian resources for its armed forces are limited, especially in light of its huge pensum and variety of ambition (arctic, warm vater ports, cyber attack capabilities, advanced missiles, and sustenance of large armed battalions), hence the Russian military doctrine is naturally characterized as defensive and pragmatic. In 2008, Putin stated towards the US leadership that NATO involvement in Ukraine and Georgia would be unacceptable. Tensions grew as president of Georgia, the US proselyte Saakashvili, assessed that it was time to reinstate full sovereignty over Georgia by Tbilisi, daring the Russians directly on CNN. Russia invaded through South Ossetia, drew its convoy to the capital, Tbilisi (like with Kiev 2022), dismantled the NATO air defense systems in Georgia and went home, reinforcing the de facto states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Ukraine, following the ousting of Kremlin backed president, Yanukovych, in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and supported de facto states in parts of Luhansk and Donetsk oblast.
A doctrine runs its course
Tensions continued to grow as NATO asserted itself deeper in Eastern Europe, The Azov Sea adjusted to the situation in Crimea, and NATO trained elements of the Ukrainian armed forces. Following the Azerbaijan victory over Armenia in 2020 the pressure on Armenia has increased with attacks in autumn 2021 + ongoing skirmishes today. Uprisings in Belarus due to broadly based outspoken dissatisfaction with the Lukasjenko regime, and uprisings in Kasakstan, where grievances were voiced forcefully in a CIA backed uprising against ruling elite in January 2021: Russia has more than its arms full with tasks in relation to upholding the aims of The Putin Doctrine. In 2021, Russia threatened Ukraine with what happened to Georgia back in 2008, and when ignored, drew up to Kiev and occupied large parts of the southeast of Ukraine, securing water supply, as well as a southern corridor through Zaporizhzhia to Crimea, while sustaining a frontline towards the NATO backed forces loyal to Kiev, west and south of ‘Donbas,’ from Luhansk to Kherson. Perhaps this approach was too doctrinal. Kiev did not back down, although Ukraine was facing potential molestation. Russia got bugged down in what soon escalated into severe interstate conflict, and Putin has called for mobilization to sustain the effort. Having ended up in a war, Russia must now change to a new military doctrine that can sustain The Russian Federation in confrontation with the worlds mightiest force.
Legacy and prospect
Legacy of The Putin Doctrine is writ large, that Russia got back on its feet in time to engage in a proxy fight with NATO on Ukrainian soil. Russia is thus weakened, but perceived at home and widely abroad, to be staunch in its unity towards survival against the aggression from The West. Here, the political myth of Kievan Rus as the origin of Russia can come to play a large role in legitimizing a new perspective for Russians in dealing with the threat coming from NATO.