Ukraine Revisited IV
A combination of poorly trained men, broken chains of supply, lack of leadership, and general chaos makes for an ineffective battle force. Desperation is omnipresent.
Escalation
Moscow articulates that it is at war with USA and U.K., and that these countries have trespassed the red line of Russia’s new nuclear doctrine. The Kremlin’s point of contention has been obvious all along: no NATO in Ukraine, since Moscow does not trust NATO to place a fighting force with missiles there, within short range of the Russian capital. Washingtons red lines has been pushed and pushed, and now US has begun shooting missiles directly into Russian prewar territory from the territory of Ukraine. After firing 6 ATACMs US ordered its embassy personel out of the building in fear of the Russian retaliation. In the morning, 21st November, Russia launched MIRV, a new missile with the nickname ‘Hazel’, due to its signature in the sky as it unfolds warheads in catkins shape: As far as we know, it devastated an industrial zone in Dnipropetrovsk. This exchange has led to a stand off, where Moscow has underlined its bid for escalation dominance.
Delicate Signaling
As long as US, U.K., and France do not continue, MIRV has achieved its purpose of deterring further attacks. We will see whether NATO will concede or seek to escalate. The potential for escalation into use of nuclear weapons is there hence the posturing between the parties is of enormous importance since this language of ‘diplomacy’ must be spoken with care for detail and clarity, due to the seriousness of the situation, but as well since the future communication rests on successful signaling. Having a near power vacuum in The White House is not especially comforting. When we see the state of the regime in Kiev, there is reason to pause and take a deep breath: Could this spin out of control? Are there anyone in The West with sufficient suffistication to parttake in this signaling?
Propaganda
The proportions are easily distorted when entertaining an audience about the war from afar. Russia has used around 5.000 missiles against Ukrainian infrastructure until now. A few hundred long range missiles fired into Russia to distort their logistics and supplies should make a difference to the outcome on the battlefield? Nevertheless, the missiles had an effect: Following the use of ATACMs and Storm Shadow missiles fired into Russia, propaganda intensified on all social media platforms, re-emerging on Wednesday 20. November 2024. Over the weekend 23-24. November, it died out again. It was simply another round of the good old Western superiority complex passed on by die har Ukraine fans on X. Paradigmatic was the regretful: ‘Had Kyiv only been given a lot of weapons sooner.’ Well why did NATO not project more power into Ukraine, faster? Why did Washington slice its own red lines, one by one? Out of respect for what the Russians might do to retaliate? Politicians are often ready to escalate. The military, for obvious reasons, is not: they are the ones in the frontline. NATO ramped up AFU from 2014 onwards and in 2021 Moscow thought it was enough of that and pointed to Minsk II agreement. The idea that a faster ramp up would have made a difference is speculation; it may have altered the course of the war, but not the outcome, I contend, but we will never know. What we do know is that the focus on propaganda victories like the defence of Bakhmut, the great summer offensive, and the Kursk incursion has depleted Kyiv’s resources faster than if the regime had focused on defending Ukraine and the well-being of its fighting force.
South of Pokrovsk
Now the situation is in dire straits. In 2024 AFU’s loses has been enormous. AFR superiority in the air and in electronic warfare gives Moscow the upper hand. Drones are used to distort logistics and ill supplied soldiers keep getting trapped in pockets along the frontline. As AFU defense line grows thinner, it becomes easier and easier for AFR to encircle AFU by cutting out their retreat; Kyiv’s forces retreat where they can and are on the verge of encirclement in south Donetsk:
On this Substack we follow the commencing siege of Pokrovsk, where the AFR, after having captured Selydove almost intact, set up their camp, and began to dominate the highway junctures to the west of the town, working their way slowly but surely into position, cutting supply lines thus pressurizing the AFU in the entire southern Donetsk:
The coming weeks, AFR will increasingly eye the juncture at Novotroitske, and seek to form a corridor south of Pokrovsk. Once Pokrovsk is lost, so it the possibility to keep the eastern front supplied. Kyiv must immediately seek to rescue their southern army from encirclement. Full retreat from Veliko Novasilka is overdue.