Russia - political stability III
Russia’s military endeavor in Ukraine has not yet shaken Kremlin, but has left it more vulnerable.
Russia’s strategic defeat in Ukraine
What is the impact of the situation in Ukraine on Russian political stability? If we make the assumption that Russia could have acted differently in face of the conflict in Ukraine during the winter of 2021/2022 given the potential economic sanctions that were in store after an invasion, then we can say that ‘the special military operation in Ukraine’ has suffered strategic defeat given one condition: namely, that the situation the armed forces of the Russian Federation have now, is not in fact what they were seeking. This is not to say that Kremlin could not have fathomed a better result of what they refer to as ‘the special military operation’, but maybe they did have a realistic gameplan related to their military doctrine, concerning what goal they could reach, given their capabilities. Speculations are legio. Whether Russia’s political objectives were regime change in Kiev or occupation of the whole country or what one might think it was, is not a part of the equation here. We simply make the assumption that Russia is experiencing strategic defeat because it has suffered the full force of economic sanctions from The West and is currently in open conflict with a NATO backed force along a 600 kilometer long frontline. Russia is bugged down into a war of attrition and it is yet not clear who is the first party to be exhausted: The NATO backed Ukrainian Nationalists or The Russian Federation.
A globalizing perspective
We have already concluded in Russia - political stability I & Russia - political stability II, that Russian political stability is still intact. But considering the assumption above, note that this conclusion indicates, that in its rivalry with Russia, USA have as well experienced strategic defeat, since the political objective of weakening Russia may have been a success in terms of stalling Russias economic development in decades to come, but until now, it has witnessed blunt failure, since politically, it has left Russia united and strong. The confrontation between Russia and its silent backer China on the one side and NATO countries and its allies and proselytes on the other side, has led to different posturing in capitals around the world. The stance taken in places like Delhi, Riyadh, and Montevideo seems to underline this conclusion, and in this light, it could be argued that despite strategic defeat, Moscow has come out better, due to its opponent suffering a similar defeat, while having a higher stake: Many governments back USA when they vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations, but do not act against The Russian Federation, nor do they buy into the narrative of The West painting Russia as the sole aggressor concerning The Ukraine Question. Well, I guess we could argue a lot of different things. The global repercussions of it all, shall interests us greatly in the years to come.
Operational defeat?
Concerning Russian political stability one question has become especially significant. What can we expect if Russia experiences operational defeat? – What happens if, say, Kiev’s forces manage to break through to Melitopol and assert themselves in a grand encirclement of the southwestern portion of the Russian forces, with the Russians unable to sustain support of these forces and its population on Crimea? If 2023 would end in such a situation, then there would be pressure on the Kremlin and its leadership and hence, Russias political stability would have to be re-evaluated. In such scenario, it cannot be excluded that Russia would make use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield, leading to a fundamentally new situation. This alone shows us, that although the developments in the conflict in Ukraine over the past year has not led to increased political instability in Russia, the geopolitical situation has left the regime in Moscow vulnerable. And by formerly placing Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson under the constitutional protection of the regime in Kremlin has increased its vulnerability.
Conclusion
An open and open-ended conflict in Ukraine may have been what Russia could get out of the situation, with the strategic downside it entailed, but a political objective is best fulfilled if it is cast out realistically. Russia has gotten on its feet and have established a strong and resilient regime (2000 - 20222) that appears to have the resources necessary to face up to what it perceives to be an existential challenge stemming from The West. It is nevertheless vulnerable due to its participation in war hence the future political stability of Russia, and thus that of Europe, hangs in the balance due to one particular geopolitical situation located on the battlefield running through four oblasts in Ukraine.