West Asia Stand Off

October 2024 resulted in a new balance of terror between Tel Aviv and Teheran. This has far reaching consequences for the balance of power in the region.

IDF air force vs, IAF air defence

On 26. October the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) attacked Iran with missiles. Already now, two days after, it seems like the attack was limited in effect. Observers are somewhat puzzled about the nature of the attack, pointing to the faillure of IDF to engage aircraft over Iranian soil, leading to the conclusion, that the attack was not carried through beyond its first phase, since IDF was unsuccessful in breaching the air defence of the Islamic Republic of Irans Armed Force (IAF). IDF apparently used 100 aircraft to launch several hundred missiles but have been unable to follow up, deterred by Iranian designed air defence backed up by Russian S - 300 and newly acquired S - 400. Or so it seems. It simply looks like Tel Aviv was not willing to risk losing some of their advanced F - 35 aircraft, a state of the art weapon system in its class only rivaled by the Turkish designed TF Kaan and perhaps in a few years the Russian Su - 57.

Advanced weapons systems

These 5th generation fighter jets are designed to bypass detection, whereby they can try to sneak in close to their target despite air defences, but apparently IDF, did not manage to secure the airspace well enough for the use of F - 35s, got cold feet, and never came close to Iranian air space with any of their aircraft. The missiles that was delivered were not all shot down by the IAF, but as analysts dive deeper into what happened, observers are waking up to a new reality of drawing out future scenarios of exchanges between Israel and Iran: F - 35 engagement is limited if IDF cannot suppress the IAF air defenses + GPS guided missiles will have their difficulties against Russian electronic warfare systems, jamming their targeting devises. IAF has no air force to speak of but does have advanced and elaborate missile capabilities, and, at least for now, the arrival of Russian technology have tipped the scales into balance.

Iran balancing Israel

The October stand off with missile strikes between IDF and IAF on 1st and 26nd October 2024 has resulted in two major hypothesis for the analyst to behold: 1) IAF can penetrate IDF air defence, while IDF cannot penetrate IAFs; 2) The limitation in deployment of 5th generation aircrafts annuls the advantage of IDF over IAF in the general assessment of the two forces mutual balance of power, ranking the two powers equal. Concerning hypothesis 1) this would establish escalation dominance for Teheran vs Tel Aviv. Concerning hypothesis 2) Following IAFs strike on 1st of October, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia denied USA use of its bases on the Arabian Peninsula to strike Iran, complicating IDF air force strike capability by forcing aircraft to refuel in the air, narrowing the operational space for maneuver drastically, due to increased operational vulnerability, while underlining the dependency of IDF on US capabilities and political connections, substantially. While the White House is currently all but unoccupied, we have seen Pentagon putting their foot down, insisting on deescalation. Pentagon does not want war against Iran, a country double the size of Ukraine in a region with many US bases and vital global oil infrastructure but The White House may think otherwise. In the coming months we shall follow the situation closely.

Limited strategic prospect

Tel Aviv is facing economic constraints due to ongoing conflict with the harbor in Eilat all but closed down and the harbor in Haifa within the range of fire. Both Ansar Allah at the cusp of the Red Sea and Hezbollah at its northern border demands a defensive posture from Israel, as IDF has severe difficulties stopping them from launching missiles. With the Gaza issue far from concluded, Tel Aviv finds itself with few options and risks falling into an endless war of attrition against The Axis of Resistance: Hamas, Ansar Allah, Hezbollah, and The Islamic State of Iran, who all have as their goal to eliminate Israel. After the onslaught in Gaza, Israel has few acquaintances (Egypt and Jordan are US vasals and thus not hostile to Israel and its cause) in the region and no friends but the superpower and its vasals, who, by their stand off against Russia in Ukraine, have pulled China, Iran and Russia close together, and thus enabled the aforementioned recent strengthening of IAFs air defences. From my perspective the conclusion is, that if the strategic prospect is not altered fundamentally, the Tel Aviv must draw USA in on its side actively in a war against Iran or face exhaustion, and, eventually, cessation.