War of Attrition in Ukraine

The Armed Forces of Ukraine got stuck in a war of attrition and lost.

1)        If the smaller power is dragged into attritional warfare, then the larger power will win: A larger power has significant advantage in manpower and resources, thus ‘larger’.

2)        If, in a war of attrition, one side will focus on maneuver and territory instead of fire and preservation of forces, then that side will loose faster: A smaller power should avoid getting ‘bogged down’, wasting experienced forces, since it is ‘smaller’.

3) Then: (tautological/analytical (1)) + (dynamic/analytical(2)) + (empirical → synthesis → conclusion); since Kyiv, the smaller power facing Moscow, often sought battles like ‘The Bakhmut Meatgrinder’, ‘The Great Offensive’. ‘Kursk Incursion’, and other politically motivated battles, Kyiv may have gained more materiel from the West (1h and 35 minutes into video), due to the attention created in the media, but these battles have depleted Kyiv’s manpower rapidly and thus accelerated Kyiv’s collapse.

Note: The dynamic induced is meta-doctrinal: It is not saying that fire and preservation is always superior to maneuver and territory, but that in a war of attrition, i.e. when maneuver and territory is hampered, then fire and preservation will be more effective and ultimately win. Kyiv’s forces has been succesful at deploying maneuver and territory to stall Moscows positional advancement, locally, but at the relatively high cost of experienced forces. That is why a war, between fairly equal sides as this one, has ended so quickly and is projected to be over already in 2026.