Ukraine Update I
The net tightens. Washington is without leverage towards Moscow when it comes to Ukraine and must draw in broader concerns of the European security architecture. Dialogue is open. War is lost.
A phone call
Adjusting to reality is difficult for Kyiv, Bruxelles, and Washington. Leading the way, the new administration in USA are engaging in dialogue with the Kremlin. Let us just say that the skillevel is uneven, but Trump and his men have been clever in opening the situation, while Kyiv is in denial and Bruxelles still intoxicated by the U.K. warmongering. Recently, a phone call between president Donal J. Trump and president Vladimir V. Putin resulted in an agreement concerning a ban on strategic bombing, targeting energy infrastructure. This is relatively easy to monitor, and could result in trust building between the parties. There are many different interests in play. Kyiv seems to be cut off from conversations and the U.K. is sidelined, as the main parties to the conflict commences a dance, where building of confidence in the others ability to keep their word, will delineate the possibility for further steps towards a truce. If the agreement is not sabotaged along the way, then incentives could rise to take further steps already the following month. The Europeans are currently without influence, talking about castles in the sky as usual, acting as a spoiler; EU has formed consensus on the lowest common denominator: continuation of conflict. More dead Ukrainian men; more Ukrainian women in despair.
AFR stumbling in
Rasputitsa came early in 2025. Larger offensive operations may soon be feasible as the mud seems to dry out soon. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is bogged down along two axis: One from Zaporizhzha streching to the east of Dniepropetrovsk and another from Pokrovsk to Kupyansk. Pressure along the front is mounting, revealing cracks in AFU defenses, but it is the northern line that is the more vulnerable: The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFR) is preparing to move west of Pokrovsk and east around Kupyansk this summer, having already delimited supplies through the logistic hub, Pokrovsk, while successfully crossing the river north of the fortress, Kupyansk. AFU consist of brave and strong fighters, occasionally well led, using its forces with great ingenuity. At times AFU suffers greatly from mere propaganda stunts, designed to bolster the credibility of the president of Ukraine in the west, while sacrificing large contingencies of men: An enklave of AFU forces were about to be caught in the south of Kursk oblast inside Russia. The plan from AFR was threefold: First pressure was added to draw forces to the north. Then the supply roads were sought blocked by a pincer in the south. And then 800 soldiers were attacking the town of Sudzha through a pipeline. The prospect was the encirclement of around 10.000 men. This could have been a devastating blow sending the whole of AFU onto the robes. It failed. Large parts of the AFU, amongst these 82nd airborne and 47th mechanized, managed to save a good part of their men and materiel.
Talks continue
The situation on the ground calls for capitulation. For 1,5 year now, it has been obvious to all observers that there is no way Kyiv will be able to improve its position; still the government in Ukraine and its masters have decided to lose more than half a million men to come to this point, where Washington has lost interest in its proxy and is seeking to look beyond defeat on the battlefield. Great uncertainty reigns. The outcome of this war is not yet clear. The Kremlin has much to win from coming to terms with the superpower at direct talks. Moscow wants withdrawal from annexed territories, a change of guards in Kyiv with a ban on the anti-russian regime, and guarantees that NATO is not expanding into Ukraine, but beyond these demands, The Kremlin wishes to discuss the broader security architecture in Eastern Europe. What is on the table beyond that, we cannot know. And what Washington can actually deliver on the ground in Ukraine, well, that is what shall now stand the test of time. One month of controlling AFU and paramilitary units are not flying drones into plants or other energy infrastructure on the Russian side. We will see. What seems likely is that dialogue is sustained and talks continue.